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Summary. A model for multiperson multicriteria decision 
making is proposed, in which each individual is character- 
ized by a  weight together with a  vector expressing that 
individual's  position  or  preferences  with  respect  to  a 
number of criteria. Next, a  one-parameter class of solu- 
tions  is  developed,  of  which  specific  members  bear  a 
strong  resemblance  to  concepts  from  statistics.  Our 
approach is related to the potential function approach in 
physics. 
Zusammenfassung. Ein Modell ft~r Mehrpersonen-Mehr- 
kriterien-Entscheidungsprobleme wird vorgeschlagen, in- 
dem  jedes  Individuum  charakterisiert  wird  yon  einem 
Gewicht  und  gleichzeitig  von  einem  Kriterien-Vektor. 
Eine  Familie yon  L6sungen,  parameterisiert yon einem 
Parameter, wird entwickelt, wobei bestimmte L6sungen in 
dieser  Familie bestimmten statistischen  Konzepten  ent- 
prechen.  Unser Ansatz weist Parallelen mit dem Ansatz 
der Potentialfunktion in der Physik auf. 
1. Introduction 
Consider a situation where a number of owners (directors, 
shareholders) of a firm have to decide on how to divide an 
amount of money over a number of investment projects. 
Or a  situation  in which voters have to choose among a 
number of candidates.  Also,  imagine a  situation  where 
some  politicians  or  political  parties  have  to  reach  a 
collective decision on, say, a road to be built or not, and 
where  each politician  has his  or her own private judge- 
ment based on the weights he or she attaches to a number 
of criteria.  All  these  -  and many more -  situations  are 
examples  of multiperson  multicriteria  decision  making, 
characterized by a similar formal structure. 
Such  a  formal  structure,  capturing  many  possible 
applications, is described and studied in this paper. More 
precisely, there will be n individuals, and each individual 
will be characterized by some positive weight as well as a 
vector of length m describing that individual's position, or 
preferences, with  respect to  m  criteria.  We  will  use  the 
term solution  for a  map assigning  to  such  an n-person 
m-criteria decision problem a set of m-vectors (preferably 
consisting  of one vector), to  be interpreted  as  compro- 
mise vectors. 
Thus, we have a model involving multiple parties with 
conflicting interests.  We make the informal assumption 
that  there  is  some institution  that proposes  a  solution, 
which is then binding:  this institution,  however, may be 
taken  in  a  broad  sense,  and  it  may  consist  of  the 
individuals themselves. We further assume, in this paper, 
that there is no  coalition formation.  Consequently,  our 
model is  closely related to the  models  studied  in  social 
choice theory and in (axiomatic, cooperative) bargaining 
game theory.  In these areas, the standard  practice is to 
determine solutions on the ground of two main criteria. 
Firstly,  it  should  be  possible  to  provide  a  reasonable 
axiomatic foundation for a solution. Secondly, preferably 
the solution should be intuitive and attractive by itself, i.e., 
as a  formula.  Historically, in game theory as well as in 
social  choice  theory,  many  solutions  were  originally 
proposed as intuitively attractive concepts, and axiomati- 
cally characterized afterwards. 
In  the  present  paper,  we  do  not  take  an  axiomatic 
approach, but rather pay attention to this second criterion. 
Specifically, we will formulate a class of solutions parame- 
trized by one parameter, allowing us to vary the extent to 
which individual power is to be taken into account. Certain 
choices of the parameter will lead to solutions related to 
statistical concepts such as median, mean, and mode, and 
to the rain max regret concept from decision theory. We will 
further show how our approach is inspired by and related to 
the use of the potential function in physics. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Sect. 2, we describe the model and, formally, the various 
applications hinted at in the beginning of  this introduction. 
Section 3 describes our one-parameter family of solutions, 
and the main results concerning these solutions.  All the 
proofs are collected in Sect. 4, and Sect. 5 concludes. 
The reader will have noticed that, up till now, we did 
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our  knowledge,  what  we  do  is  new,  but  of course not 
unrelated  to  existing  literature.  Therefore,  we  restrict 
ourselves at this point to a selection of a few general works 
on the mentioned areas:  Fandel (1972) on multicriteria 
analysis, Hwang and Lin (1987) on multicriteria analysis, 
French  (1986)  on  decision  making.  We  apologize  in 
advance  to  all  authors  who  should  also  have  been 
mentioned. 
2. The Model and Applications 
An  n-person  m-criteria  decision  problem  is  an  ordered 
2n-tuple  (wi,~i)i=l,  2 ..... n  where,  for  each  iEN:= 
{1,2  .... ,n},  w i  is  an  element  of  N~:={xEIRm.'xj>O, 
j=  l, 2, . . ., m},  and  ~  is  a  positive  real  number.  The 
general  interpretation  of such  a  problem is  as  follows. 
Each individual  iCN  is  characterized by the  vector w g 
expressing  the  weights  that  individual  attaches  to  m 
criteria, and the number ~)i interpreted as an indication of 
that individual's power or influence. 
An investment problem.  Each individual is a shareholder of 
the same firm. The number ~0 i expresses that individual's 
power,  for which  the percentage of shares  is  a  natural 
candidate. The vector w i states how much money individ- 
ual i would invest in each of m projects, provided he/she 
were to decide by himself/herself. The problem is to find a 
compromise vector expressing to a smaller or larger extent 
the individual powers  and  preferences. In other words, 
one wants a final answer to the question how much money 
to invest in each project. 
Another (open-ended) interpretation could go as fol- 
lows. Each individual i contributes an amount of money 
0 i.  The  total  sum  E~= 1~o  i, is  then to be invested  in  m 
projects.  Thereby, the  vector w i may be  interpreted in 
several ways. One way would be to think of wjas giving the 
return or utility to individual i of an investment of 1 unit of 
money in project j, assuming that these utilities are linear 
and additive, and possibly relative to a 0-criterion (proj- 
ect) with fixed weight (utility) 1 suppressed from notation. 
A  political  decision problem.  Consider n politicians who 
have to reach a unanimous decision on whether to build a 
road or not. Ultimately, the decision will be taken on the 
basis of the weights assigned to a number of criteria, such 
as  economical importance  and  environmental damage. 
The  modeling  of this  decision  is  a  problem  in  itself, 
preceded by the problem of finding a compromise vector 
of weights attached to the different criteria, which belongs 
to the realm of this paper. The numbers ~i might reflect 
the  strengths  or  sizes  of the  parties  of the  politicians. 
Again, the weights of the criteria may be interpreted as 
relative to the fixed weight, e.g. 1, of some 0-criterion. 
A  voting problem.  There are n voters. Voter i has ~i votes 
(absolute, or as a percentage). The vector w i describes the 
way in which individual i ranks the m candidates accord- 
ing to strength of preference, so the numbers wj may be 
taken relative again. Again, one looks for a compromise 
vector ranking the m candidates (eventually, the candidate 
with the highest number might be elected, or some other 
procedure  followed).  A  natural  way  to  reach  such  a 
compromise  vector  may  be  to  add  all  the  votes  per 
candidate  after  first  distributing  the  individual  votes 
according to the individual rankings. 
A  prediction problem.  The m criteria are now m states of 
the economy, exactly one of which will be true. There are n 
wise  economists,  oi  being  a  measure  of economist  i's 
wisdom. Economist i attaches probability wjto state of the 
economyjbeing the true state. How to find a compromise 
prediction? 
These  examples  indicate  that,  with  some  flexibility of 
interpretation, a variety of situations may be described by 
the same formal structure. They also show that one of the 
main problems in mathematical modeling (of this kind, 
but in general as well) is to choose the "right" scaling or 
normalizations.  We  take  the  0 i  to  be  any  positive 
numbers, and the w i to be any nonnegative vectors, since 
we  have  no  reason  to  choose  any  particular  (other) 
normalization.  Of course,  one might  want  to  choose a 
specific normalization depending on the specific context 
at hand, e.g. the coordinates of the w i summing to 1 in the 
prediction problem above. The results in this paper will be 
valid also under such a normalization. 
We  conclude  this  section  with  the  definition  of  a 
solution.  Let  N  denote  the  collection  of  all  n-person 
m-criteria decision problems. Unless stated otherwise, P is 
used to denote the typical problem <w  i, ~)i)i =  l, 2 ..... n E ~. A 
solution  is a correspondence q~ : ~  P,~ assigning to each 
problem P E N  a nonempty set of "compromise" vectors 
q~(P). In the next section, we will mainly consider a specific 
one-parameter family of solutions.  In  many interesting 
cases, these solutions will be single-valued. 
3. Solutions  to the Multiperson Multicriteria  Problem 
We  will  first  describe  four  solutions  for  the  n-person 
m-criteria decision problem. Later on we will show that 
these  solutions  are  particular  instances  from  a  one- 
parameter  family  of  solutions.  This  will  already  be 
reflected in the notations we use for these solutions. 
The  mode  solution  q~O  is  defined  ~0~  =  {wi: 
Zj:wJ=wi~gJ~Ej:wJ=wk~) j  for  every kr  This  solution 
takes only the power indices ~)i into consideration, not the 
weight vectors w i.  It obeys the most powerful individu- 
al(s), where it is understood that power indices are added 
if weight  vectors  coincide.  It  takes  its  name  from  the 
statistical concept of mode: the analogy becomes trans- 
parent if we interpret ~i as the frequency of observing the 
"value"  w i  of  some  stochastic  variable  in  a  random 
experiment. In some contexts it may be a very reasonable 
solution. For instance, if we take the voting example with 
each voter giving all votes to the most preferred candidate, 
then the mode solution simply reflects majority voting. 
The median solution ~o 1 is defined by ~p 1  (p) =  {z E P,~ : z 
minimizes  2]=l~)i[Ix--will2},  where  11"112 denotes  the 
Euclidean norm:  [Ixll2= x/x~+ ... +X~m ￿9 That this solu- 
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It is related to the statistical concept of median: also this 
will be argued later. Compromises assigned by (01  minim- 
ize the power-weighted sum of Euclidean distances to the 
weight vectors. 
The mean solution (02 is defined by (02(p) =  {El= 1 ~)iwi/ 
2]=1 oi}.  This solution assigns  to a  problem the power 
weighted  average  of  the  weight  vectors.  It  is  clearly 
analogous to the statistical concept of mean if we interpret 
again  ~O i as  the frequency of observing w i in a  random 
experiment. 
The  minmax  solution  (0~  is  defined  by  (0~'(P)= 
{zEN~'maxieNll  z-will  2  :  minx~a2  maxi6N  II x- 
will 2}. Also this solution is single-valued, as will be shown 
later. It does not take the power indices 0 i into account 
but just  minimizes  maximal  distance  to  the  individual 
weight vectors. In spirit,  it is  akin to Rawls's  maximin 
principle, see Rawls (1971). It is analogous to the minimax 
regret  concept  in  (one-person)  decision  making  under 
uncertainty,  see  e.g.  French  (1986,  p.  37),  or  Savage 
(1951). 
The  main  insight  of  this  paper  is  that  these  four 
solutions can be obtained as particular instances from a 
whole  family  of  solutions.  But  first  we  start,  more 
generally,  by  considering  functions  Uf: IR  m -~ IR  of the 
form 
Uf(x)=  ~  o~(11 x-will)  (1) 
i  1 
for  a  given  problem  PE~,  where f:[0,~)~lt  is  a 
continuous  monotonically  strictly  increasing  function, 
and II "11  is a norm on IR  m. The value Uf(x) is interpreted 
as measuring the potential conflict between, or aggregate 
disutility  of,  the  individuals  resulting from imposing  a 
compromise vector x @ pro. It is our (or the individuals', 
or an  arbitrating  institution's)  objective to find a  com- 
promise which minimizes this function. Readers familiar 
with physics will recognize the close analogy between this 
approach and the potential function approach in physics. 
We  will  digress  on  this  analogy  later  on  this  section. 
Here, we proceed by collecting some facts on the func- 
tion Uf in the following theorem. All proofs are delayed 
until Sect. 4. 
Theorem 1. Let Uf be the function defined in (1).  Then: 
(a)  Uf has a global minimum. 
(b)  If  f  is convex,  then  UU is convex,  and hence the global 
minimum locations of Uf  form a convex set. 
(e)  If  f  is strictly convex the Uf is also strictly convex and 
hence Uf has a unique global minimum location. 
If furthermore,  II "II  is the Euclidean norm,  then: 
(d)  Every global minimum location of Uf is an element of the 
convex hull of the points w i (i C N). 
(e)  If  f  is convex and Uf has two different global minimum 
locations x  and y,  then every point w i is an element of the 
straight line through x and y. 
We will be particularly interested in functionsfofthe form 
f(y) =y", a >  0. For convenience, we use the notation U ~ 
instead of Ufiff(y)=y~  and  I[" II is the Euclidean norm. 
So 
& 
U~(x) =  ~  ~il[x--will~,  xEIR  m 
i=1 
Note that f(y) =y~ is  convex if and  only if a >  1,  and 
strictly convex if and only if a >  1. So, in view of Theorem 
1,  U ~ has  a  unique  minimum  location  situated  in  the 
convex hull  of {wi:iEN}  whenever a >  1.  If a =  1, the 
global  minimum  location does  not  have  to  be unique; 
however, if the points w i are not collinear, then also in that 
case  the  global  minimum  location  will  be  unique.  If 
0 <  a <  1, then still U a has a global minimum, but it does 
not  have to  be  attained  at  a  unique point.  We further 
define  U~  U~(x)  for x CIR  m.  The  following 
sequence  of theorems  shows  that  the  solutions  for the 
n-person  m-criteria  decision  problem  defined  above, 
namely the mode, median, mean, and minmax solutions 
(0o,  (01, (02  and  (0~, respectively,  can  be  obtained  by 
considering the sets of global minimum locations of U ~ 
U 1,  U 2,  and  the  limit  of minimum  locations  of U ~ for 
a ~ ~, respectively. 
Theorem 2. (00(p) is the set of global minimum locations of 
the function  U ~ 
It follows from the (simple) proof of Theorem 2 that it 
would hold for any other norm instead of the Euclidean 
norm. 
Theorem 3. (a)  (01 (p) is the set of  global minimum locations 
of U 1. 
(b)  Let v ~ denote the (unique) global minimum location of 
Ua for a> 1. Then v 1 := lima+iv a exists and v 1E (01(P). 
(c)  If  not  all  w i  are  on  the  same  straight  line,  then 
(01(P) ={vl). 
(d)  Suppose  all  w i  are  on  the  same  line,  say 
w z  =p + 2i(q --p) for points p ~  q on that line and 2 i ~  JR. 
Then."  either  there  exist  kEN  and  0<2<1  such  that 
~i:2i<)~k~i _L 2 Zi:~.i=2k ~i =  ~i: 2i> 2  k ~i ~_ (1 -- 2) Ei: ~=ak 0 / 
or  there  exist  adjacent  w k  and  w l  (2k<2t)  with 
Zi:Ai~2k  ~9i :  Zi : .~i~ )~  l ~i. 
In the former case,  (01 (p) =  {wk}, while in the latter case 
(01 (P) is the line segment connecting w k and w l. In the latter 
case,  the  point  v I  is  determined  by  the  formula 
pi 
Hi:,~i<_A~ll vl -will2  --  I~i:);i~> 2l]]l)l  -  will~ ~. 
Note that (as we have noted before) in "most" cases  (01 
assigns  a  unique point to  a  problem P"  see part  (c)  of 
Theorem 3. Part (d) describes the situation in which all the 
criteria  vectors  w i  are  on  the  same  straight  line.  It  is 
because of this situation that we have assigned the name 
"median  solution"  to  (01: again,  interpret  ~9 i  as  the 
frequency of observing w i, where the points w i are ordered 
along a straight line. Note that (d) offers a way to select a 
unique point from the median in the case of nonunique- 
ness, namely the point v  1 (for which a formula is given as 
well). Further, in the general case where the w i are not on 
the same line, the unique element of (01 (p) can be viewed as 
a generalization of the median: as such, the concept might 
be useful in multivariate statistics where the outcomes of a 
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Theorem 4.  ~02(P) consists  of the  unique  global minimum 
location of U 2. 
Theorem 5. v  ~ := lim~ ~  v ~ exists,  and {vo,} =  ~pOO(p). 
Theorem 5 states that the global minimum locations of  the 
functions U ~ for a going to infinity converge to a unique 
point, namely the point assigned by the minmax solution 
~0 =.  Indeed,  at  this  point  the  power  indices  of  the 
individuals do not matter any more, only the distances to 
the criteria vectors are relevant. The other extreme was the 
case a =  0 where only the power indices of the individuals 
were  important.  So  any  0<a<~  is  a  compromise 
between  individual  power  and  individual  regret,  the 
former being  maximal  for  a =  0,  the  maximum  of the 
latter minimal for a -~ ~. It should be noted that Theorem 
5 holds for a larger class of norms: this is proved in Sect. 4. 
Let us summarize our main findings. We have intro- 
duced a family of functions U ~, 0 <  a <  ~, which can be 
interpreted as measuring the degree of conflict, or aggre- 
gate disutility, between the individuals in a  multiperson 
multicriteria decision problem. For any a, the set of  global 
minimum locations of U ~ determines  a  solution to the 
problem.  For  a =0, 1,2,  and  approaching  infinity,  we 
obtain  the  intuitively appealing  solutions  called  mode, 
median, mean, and minmax, respectively, in view of the 
analogy with descriptive statistics. Particular choices of a 
will  depend  on the  context of application.  We  already 
mentioned a few times that our approach is closely related 
to the potential function approach in physics; recently, a 
similar inspiration has been fruitful in game theory, see 
Mas-Colell and Hart (1989). An earlier application of the 
potential function approach to game theory can be found 
in  Spinetto  (1971).  We  conclude  this  section  with  a 
digression on the potential function in physics, and a few 
physical analogies of our context. 
A  point  mass  is  situated  on  this  plane  at  point  x. 
Thread i connects this point mass to another point mass 
sized t) i, via the hole at wi(iEN);  the latter is hanging 
below w i, and therefore exerts a force on x with size t) i, in 
the direction of w i. 
If x  doesn't  coincide  with  one  of the  w i,  the  total 
W i --X 
force exerted on x equals  ZiEN~O i  ilwi__xl[2  . This force 
corresponds  to  the  potential  G(X)=Y~iENOillwi--x][2 
(which function is defined at the w i too). We conclude that 
this physical model corresponds to the median solution 
(01 . 
(d)  Helical  springs.  Let  p~  be  the  spring  constant  of 
helical spring i (i E N), which is connected to fixed point w i 
at one side, and to a point mass at point x at the other side 
(so  all  springs  are  connected to  each  other at  x).  The 
force  exerted  on  point  x  now  equals:  Zi~u~Oi(wi--x). 
The  corresponding  potential  is  equal  to:  G(x)= 
Ei6Npil]x--wil[ 2.  If VG(x)=O,  which is the case when 
~i@N ~  )iWi 
x --  , x  is a stationary point. 
~.i@N ~O i 
So we conclude that this physical model corresponds to 
the mean solution ~o  2. 
4.  Proofs  and  Auxiliary  Results 
This  section  contains  no  new  material.  It  presents  the 
proofs of the results in the previous section, together with 
some auxiliary results and a few extensions; a reader not 
interested in these proofs may skip the section. 
The following elementary lemma will be needed in the 
sequel. We state it without proof. Recall that 11" II 2 denotes 
the Euclidean norm. 
Digression on the Use of the Potential in Physics 
(a)  Gravitation. Let w i (i EN) be points with mass ~)i The 
field  of  gravitation  is  described  by  the  potential 
G(x)=--EieN~oil[x--will21,  for  xEIR  3.  For  x(~ 
{wi:iCN},  the  gradient  vector  of  G  is  VG(x)= 
__ y,i@N ~)i  wi--x  i[x_wil[ 3  and  gives  the  forces exerted on 
x  by  the  point  masses  w i.  If  VG(x)=O,  then  x  is  a 
stationary point; in any direction, the potential is  con- 
stant, and consequently a point mass at x will not move. 
(b)  An  electric  field.  The  potential  E(x)=Y~ieN~)i[lx 
wi--x 
-will21  with gradient VE(x) =~.ieN~) i  ]ix__will 3  de- 
scribes  the  situation  where  the  w e are  particles  with 
positive charge pc. Again, the gradient vector describes the 
electric forces exerted on a positively charged particle at x. 
The following two examples present physical analogies 
of the median solution ~pi and the mean solution ~p2. 
(c)  Holes in aplane. Let w i be the coordinates of a hole in a 
horizontal  plane  in  a  standard  gravitational  field (e.g. 
somewhere on the earth). 
Lemma 1. Let a, b @ P," with Ila §  b[12 =  Ilall 2 §  [Ibll2. Then 
a = 0 or b =/zafor some i~ E [0, o~). 
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) Choose A >0 such that [[w/ll <A 
for  all  iEN.  Let  xE ~m  with  [[xl[  >2A.  Then,  for 
every i@N: [[x--wi[[ >  I[x]] --[[w/[[ >A,  hence  Uf(x)= 
~n= 1 ~oif([lx -- will) >  ~n= 1 ~oV(A) ~  zn= 1 ~oif([I  0 -- will) = 
Uf(0), where we use the fact thatfis monotonically strictly 
increasing.  So  infx~m Uf(x)- infx~2A0)Uf(x)  where 
B2A (0) =  {X ~  ~;{m : II x[I <  2A }. Since B2z(0) is compact and 
Uf  continuous  as  a  composition  of  two  continuous 
functions,  we  know that  Uf has  a  global  minimum  on 
B2z(0) and hence on ~m. 
(b) The second statement follows immediately from the 
first  statement.  For  the  first  statement,  let  x, y  @ IR  m 
and  0 <2 <  1.  Then  Uf(2x+(1 --2)y)=  Z~=l pf(ll2x+ 
(1 -- 2)y  -- will) =  Y~= 1 ~[f(ll,~(x-  w e) +  (1  -- )0(Y  -- wi)[I) 
<  2~=l~o'fUII2(x-wi)l[+ll(1-;O(y-wi)ll)  <_  2~=1 
oi(2f(llx -  well) + (1 -  ,t)f(l[ y -  well)) =  ,tUf(x) + (1 -,t) 
Uf(y). 
(c)  If  f is strictly convex, then the second inequality in the 
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(d)  Suppose v ~  IR m is not an element of the convex hull W 
of {w i: i ~ N}. Then, by a well-known separation theorem 
from  convex  analysis,  there  exists  p ~  ~t m,  p v  a 0,  with 
p'v<minx~v/p'x  (the  dot  denotes  the  usual  inner 
product  on  lRm).  Let  c:=min~wp'x,  and  d:=v+ 
c--p.v 
p.  Then  p'd=c<p'x  for  all  x~W,  in  p'p 
particular  p.d<p'w  i  for  all  i~N.  Now  lid-will 2= 
I/v -  w i +  c -p"  v  "pll~ =  IIv +  will~ +  (c --p"  13)  2  -- 
p  "p  p  "p 
2c--p.v  p.(13__wi)=  iiv__will~+  c--p  V  (c--p'v 
p  "p  p  "p 
+2p.(13--wi))  [[v--wiH~+  c--p'V((e--p.wi)+ 
p'p 
(p.v--p.wi))<[iv  will 2. So, foreveryi~N,  [Id--wi]]2 
<  1113 -  will2 .  Now  Uf(d)  =  X]=~oif(lld-  wil12)  < 
Y,'/=i#f(llv-willa)=gf(v),  so  13  cannot  be  a  global 
minimum  location  of  U~  Hence  any  global  minimum 
location must be in the convex hull of {wi:i~N}. 
(e)  Let 0 <  2 <  1, then Uf(2x + (1 -- 2)y) =  Uf(x) =  Uf(y), 
by part (b) of this theorem. Hence, in the proof of part (b) 
we  must  have  only equalities  in this  case.  In particular, 
it  follows  that  for  all  i@N  we  have  ll2(x-wZ)+ 
(1--2)(y--wi)l[2  =  II;~(x-wi)tl2  +  [l(1-2)(y-wi)ll2. 
Applying  lemma  1 and  rearranging  terms,  we find  that 
for  some  number  It>0  we  have:  wi=ax+fly,  where 
2  --It +  2/1 
a  -  and fl --  ￿9 Since a +  fl =  1, 
2  It +  2it  ,t -- It +  2/~ 
we  conclude  that  w i  is  an  element  of the  straight  line 
through x  and y. This holds for any i ~  N.  [] 
Parts  (d)  and  (e)  of Theorem  1 indeed  do  not  hold  for 
arbitrary  norms.  For  instance,  let  N={1,2},  m=2, 
w 1 =  (0, 0), w 2-  (1,0), p~ =  OR =  1, Ilxll =  max{Ixxl, Ix21} 
for all x ~  IR  ~, and letfbe  identity. Then the set of global 
minimum  locations  of the  corresponding  function  Uy is 
1  1 
the convex hull of  {w~,  w2, (~-, ~-), (1,  --1)}.  So nei- 
ther (d) nor (e) hold for this norm. 
Proof of Theorem  2.  Obviously,  U~  =  lim~. 0 UC'(x) = 
2i: x~wi ~o i. So (o~  (P) =  {w i : 2w~=w i ~oJ >__ Zw~= w  k ~gJ for every 
kr  is the set of global minimum locations  of U ~  [] 
Before proving Theorem 3, we need the following lemma. 
Some additional notation: let g" [0, ~) --* IR~ be a function 
assigning to every a >  0 a global minimum location of U ~. 
Lemma 2.  Ua(g(a))  is a continuous function  of a on (0, ~). 
Remark.  It can be shown that U~(g(a)) is also continuous 
at ct =  0; this however, needs an additional proof(since U ~ 
is not continuous), which we omit since we do not need the 
result in the sequel. 
Proof of Lemma 2.  Suppose U~(g(e)) is not continuous at 
some fl >  0.  We will show that this  leads to a  contradic- 
tion.  Define  U(x,  c  0  =  U~(x) for a E (0, ~)  and x E  ~m. 
Then  U is continuous  on  ]R  m X (0, ~).  Since,  by assump- 
tion,  D(g(a), a) is not continuous  at fl, there is a sequence 
al,  a2,  ...  with  limk-~ak=fl  and  an  e>0  such  that 
I U(g(ak),  ak)  -- ~J(g(fl),fl)[  >  e  for  all  k E  N.  Since,  by 
Theorem  1 (d),  for all k E  N, g(ak)  is an element  of the 
convex hull of {w i : i E N}, which is a compact set, there is a 
converging subsequence, say g(fik) and z : =  limk ~ ~ g(flk). 
Then  limk-~ (g(fik), ilk) = (Z, fl)  and  D'(z, fl)  =  limk ~ 
(J(g(J3k),  ilk)  <_  limk~  U(g(fi),  ilk)  =  (s  By 
definition ofg(fi) we also have (7(z, b) >  (J(g(fl), fl), hence 
~s  =  (J(g(fi),fi)  and  so  limk-~(J(g(flk),flk)  = 
Cr(g(fi), fi), a  contradiction  since {ilk} is a  subsequence  of 
{a~}.  [] 
Proof of Theorem 3.  (a) follows by definition. 
We now first prove the statements in (d), except for the 
last statement  there.  Let p, q, and 2i(iCN)  as in (d).  Let 
further  x  and y  be global minimum  locations  of U 1 and 
suppose wJ =  2x +  (1 --2)y for somejEN  and 0 <2  <  1. 
Apply the argument used in the proof of Theorem 1 (b) to 
these points x  and y: since x  and y  are global minimum 
locations, it follows that we must have equality signs there 
everywhere,  and  in  particular  [[2(x--wJ)  +  (1--2)(y-- 
wJ) I[2  =  [[~(x--wJ)[I2  ~-  [[(1--2)(y--wJ)[[2.  Since  the 
lefthandside expression must be 0, we have x =  wJ = y. We 
conclude  that  the  (convex) set of global minimum  loca- 
tions  of U 1 must be a  subset  of a  line  segment with two 
adjacent elements of {wi: iEN}  as endpoints,  say w k and 
w l with 2k <  2l. For the global minimum location x in the 
convex hull  of {w k, wl}, it is easy to show that:  Ul(x)  = 
ZieN~illx  -- will2 =  Zi:Xi_<~  k ~)illx--wkll2  +  Zi:;~/>_& t)illx 
-- wql2.  If Y,i:,ti<2 k ~)i=Ei:)oi~)~ i ~)i, then  U 1 is constant on 
the convex hull of{w k, w l} which implies that this is exactly 
the set of global minimum locations.  Otherwise, we have, 
say, Zi:~i<x  k t) i >  Y,i:2i>2l ~?i and hence x =  w k must be the 
unique  global  minimum  location.  Since,  by  a  similar 
argument, Ei:xi<~  k ~)i <  Ei:~i_>xk ~)i, there must exist a 2 as 
in statement  (d).  We have proven (d)  except for the  last 
statement. 
We continue by proving the final statement in (d). Let V 
denote  the  convex hull  of w k and  w l,  that  is,  the  set  of 
global minimum locations of U 1. For every i C N  let Iti be 
defined  by  wi=wk-Titi(wl--wk).  We  denote  I+= 
{iEN:iti~  1} and I- ={iEN:iti<O}.  For It C [0,1] and 
z =  w k +it(w/-  w k) ~  Vwe have: [IiE I  IIz- wellf '=  lie l 
--  wkll~ i~I-~  IIi~z-  (/1  -- Iti)#  which  is  a  continuous 
strictly monotonically  increasing  function  of It on  [0,  1] 
~'  is  a  vanishing  at/1=0.  Analogously,  FIi~r+ ][z--wi]12 
continuous  strictly monotonically decreasing function  of 
It on [0,  1] vanishing  at It =  1. This impfies that there  is 
exactly one ~ C  Vwith  HiE I-  IlZ  --  willf ~ =  1-Iicz+ 1[~ -- 
will~ '. Moreover, 2 r  w k, w( 
Next, let the function H: IR  m --* ~  be defined  by H(x) 
:= zics(~)0 i In ([[x -- wil[2)[lx -- will2, where J(x)  := {i E 
N: w i r  x}. Since, in particular,  limt+0 t In t =  0, H  is con- 
tinuous on IR m. Let x =  w e + It(w l -- wk), 0 <  It <  1. Then 
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d 
in ([]w z-  wkl[2(/~i--p)). So, for/z ~(0, 1),  ~  H(w k 4- 
/4wZ-wk))  =  IlwZ-wkl[  2  Ei~-pi(ln(llwl--wk[12(It-- 
/Zi))4-  1)  --  ][WZ--wk[12  2e~i+#(ln(llwZ-wglh(,ue-/O ) 
4- 1).  Since Y~i~l pi =  y~i~i  +  ~o i, this reduces to: 
d 
d/J 
--  H(w k + p(w ~  -- Wk)) 
=  IIw ~-  wktl2  ~  piln (llw z-  wkll2(/~ --~i)) 
i@I 
=  _  iiw z_  wklh  ~  ~i In (llw  ~-  wklh(~z~  --~z)), 
iGI + 
and this function is negative for/z close to 0, positive for 
/~  close  to  1,  continuous  and  strictly  monotonically in- 
creasing  on  (0,1).  So  there  is  exactly  one  point 
~=wk+fi(w~--w k)  with  0<fi<l  where  H  takes  a 
d 
minimum  on  V.  From  H(2) =0,  it  follows  that 
d/z 
Zi~I  ~oiln(llwl--wkH2(/Yt--fli))  =  "~i~i+ ~oiln(l[w l- 
wkll2(/~i-- fi)),  hence  Zi~z- piln [12--wi[[2  =  Y~i~i+ ~o i 
In [197--wi1]2.  So  )7=5.  In  other  words,  5  is  the  unique 
d 
minimum  location  of H  on  V.  Further,  da  U'~(x)  = 
d 
d~ Eis! ~)illx  --  wi[[~  =  Zi~J(x)  ~)i In (llx -  wilh)llx - 
d  i  a  w  l12,  hence  H(x)  --  U~(x)la=l.  So  H(x)  = 
da  UI+e_  UI(x) 
lim, ~  0 
g 
The  proof  of  (d)  is  finished  if  we  show  that 
lima+~ v a =5, i.e., lima~lg(a) =5. We suppose this is not 
the  case  and  will  derive  a  contradiction.  If  not 
lima ~  ~  g(a) =  5, there is an e >  0 and a sequence a~, a2, ... 
with  limg~O'k=0  such  that  limg~=g(1 +ag)=y 
for  some  y  on  the  straight  line  through  the  w i  and 
such  that  Ilg(l+a~)-SIl~>~  for  all  /C  (recall  Theo- 
rem  1 (d)). In particular,  Ily-511~>_e.  By Lemma 2, we 
have:  Ul(g(1))=limk~=  ul+~  +ak))  =  2i~i~o i 
limk-o. [[g(1 +  ak) -- will l +~  =- ~"i~I pi limk ~~  [[g(1 +  ak) 
--  wi[[~ =  Ul(y).  So y~V,  and H(y)>HQ)  since  5  is 
the  unique  minimum  location  of  H  on  V.  Let  c  := 
1 
-~ (H(y)-  H(c)).  Since  H  is  continuous,  there  exists 
d>0  such  that  [Ix--y[[2~d~H(x)>__H(y)--c  for  all 
xC R m.  Let  koEN  such  that  k > ko ~  [Ig(l + ak)--y[[2 
<d,  and  let  r:=y+d  z--Y  ￿9 Then  []r--y[[2=& 
115 -yll2 
such that for all k>/cl:  ul+ak(5)-  UI(z)  <H(5)+  c 
and  U1 +~(r) -- g l(r)  ak 
> H(r) -- c >  H(5) + 2c.  For 
tYk 
k>kl  we  now  have:  Ul+~k(r)  >  ak(H(5)+ 2c)+ Ul(r) 
>  ag(H(5)+c)  4-  Ul(r)4-CGk  ~  ul+Crk(~,)@Cak  > 
U 1  + ~k(5), a contradiction with what we have found above. 
This completes the proof of (d). 
As to (b), we still have to prove this statement for the 
case  that  U 1 has  a  unique  global  minimum  location. 
Suppose x is a limit point of {g(a)}~ ~  1, that is, there exist 
al, a2  .... with limk ~ ~ ak =  1 and limk ~ = g(ak) = X. Just as 
above, using Lemma 2, we derive U 1  (g(1)) =  U 1  (x), so x = 
g(1) by uniqueness.  Since this holds for any limit point of 
g(a) (a ~ 1) and since all g(a) are in the (compact) convex 
hull of {w i: i E N}, we conclude g(1) =  lima t l g(a) = v 1 @ 
(o l(p). This completes the proof of (b), and (c) is immedi- 
ate.  [] 
Proof of Theorem 4. Since, for a >_ 2,  U ~ is differentiable 
everywhere, it is sufficient to set the gradient of U a equal 
to 0 in order to find the unique global minimum location 
(recall that U a is strictly convex for a >  1, cf. Theorem  1 
(c)).  The  gradient  of  U ~  is  the  vector  E~=loi[[x  -- 
wi[[~-2(x -- w').  Taking a  =  2  and setting the gradient 
equal  to 0, we obtain ET= l~Oi(X  --  W i)  =  0,  hence v 2 = 
27=1 p~w i 
￿9 So  {v 2} =  ~o2(P).  [] 
Xn=l  ~O i 
We conclude this section by proving some results that will 
imply Theorem 5. 
Lemma3.Let II'[I  beanynorm on R  m, and let M a : R m --+ ]R 
be defined by M~(x) =  ET= 1 oil[x -- wi[[  ~. For a >  1, let t(a) 
denote the (unique) global minimum location of M ~. Sup- 
pose there is a sequence al, a2, ... with limk-= ak =  ~  and t 
:= limk~= t(ak) C R~. Then minx~ w, maxi~N [Ix -- wil[ = 
maxiEN lit -- will. 
Proof  Suppose not, i.e.  maxi~N  lit -- wi[[ >_ c  +  2 e for 
some e>0,  where c  := minxc~m max/~N  [Ix -- wi[[ (the 
existence  of  the  rain  max  is  obvious,  and  left  to  the 
reader to prove)￿9 There is/Co C N  such that/C >  ko ~  ZiON 
~)/[[ t(ak) -- wil[ ~k >  p(C + ~)a~, where 0  := minieN pi. Let 
Z  E  ~m such that max/E U [[ Z -- will =  minx ~ ~m maxi~ U [[ X 
-- wi[[. Then ~iCN &oi[[  Z -- wil[ a ~  ~,iCN ~  Oi ca for all a. Take 
/Cl >__ k0 such that/C >_ kl ~  ~icu ~i C  ak <  ~)(e Jr ,~) ak. Then if 
/C  >  /Cl, we  have:  Mak(z)  <  Mak(t(ak)),  a  contradic- 
tion.  [] 
For all/C >/c0, r is a convex combination of g(1 +  ak) and 
2; since U 1  +~  +  ak)) <  U 1  + ok(~) and U 1  +~k is strictly 
convex, we have: U 1  + ~k(r) <  U 1  + ~  for all/C >  k0. Also, 
H(r) > H(y) -- c =H(5) +  3c,  and  U l(r) =  U 1  (5) =  U 1  (y) 
since r is a convex combination ofy and 5. Choose/CI >/c0 
Lemma4.  Let M a and t(a) be as  in Lemma  3.  Suppose 
furthermore that I1" II is a strictly quasiconvex function,  i.e. 
1[ Y[[ =  [I z[I =  l[2y + (1 -- 2)z[[ <  1[ y [1 whenevery, z @ ~m, y 
4= z, and 0 < 2 <  1. Then lima ~ ~ t(a) exists and is equal to 
the  unique point  t  with  max/~N  [It  --  wi][ =  minxes,, 
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Proof In view of Lemma 3 and the fact that every t(a) is in 
the (compact) convex hull of the points w i, it suffices to 
show that the point t is unique. Suppose maxi~v Ils -  will 
=  minxE~m maxi~N IIx-will  =: c for some s@IR m.  Let 
1  1 
~? :=  ~- t +  ~- s  and  suppose  1[~? -- wJ][ >  I[Y~  -- will  for 
wJ  all  i E  N. Then  1[~2 -- wJl[ =  t -- W j) @  --f  (S  -- 
1  1 
<  ~-c+-~-c=c.  Since  also  [[:?-wJll  >_c,  we  have 
1  1  --w J)  ]lt-wJll=lls-wJll=cand  -~ (t-  wJ) + ~  (s 
l  (t_w  j)  +  2  (s-w  j)  .  By  strict  quasicon- 
vexity,  we  conclude  t--wJ=s--w  j,  hence  t=s  as  re- 
quired.  [] 
Theorem  5  now follows from Lemma 4  because  1['ll2 is 
strictly quasiconvex. 
5.  Conclusion 
We have introduced a model for multiperson multicriteria 
decision making, and proposed a one-parameter family of 
solutions for such decision problems.  The emphasis  was 
on the intuitive contents of these solutions, inspired by the 
analogy with  statistical  concepts  on the  one  hand,  and 
with the potential function in physics on the other hand. A 
main concern for future research will be the development 
of an axiomatic basis for these solutions. 
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